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GOVERNANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES:
THE USE OF CODES OF CONDUCT AND LITIGATION TO CHANGE
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES’ BEHAVIOR
By
MARIA FERNANDA MATACH
(Under the direction of Gabriel M. Wilner)
ABSTRACT
Today no regulation adequately makes multinational enterprises
(MNEs) comply with minimum human rights, labor, and environmental
standards. Although there are many international initiatives and corporate
codes, they lack enforcement mechanisms sufficient to ensure compliance.
Further, individuals attempting to litigate claims against MNEs have to
overcome many obstacles, such as piercing the corporate veil and forum non
conveniens dismissals.
A positive change will occur if developing countries jointly set
minimum standards and focus on implementation and enforcement. It is also
recommended that the international community support this process by
exerting pressure on a country or MNE that is not complying with the
minimum standards. Finally, it is very important to make litigation against
MNEs an available remedy for individuals by providing adequate forums,

I

revising corporate law to prevent the evasion of responsibility by assertion of
the separate entities principle, and applying a more sensitive forum non
conveniens doctrine.
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I. INTRODUCTION

As traditional enterprises have evolved and grown to become the
complex group of enterprises known as multinational enterprises (MNEs),
they

have

become

principal

actors

in

the

international

arena.1

Unfortunately, there is no parallel between the growth of MNEs and the
creation of new laws to regulate them. There is no binding international
law for MNEs that could regulate their conduct and provide for liability.2
Nevertheless, this does not mean that MNEs are not subject to any law.
Under the sovereignty principle, a state has the right “to regulate and
supervise the activities of transnational corporations within its national
jurisdiction and take measures to ensure that such activities comply with
its laws, rules and regulations and conform with its economic and social
policies.”3 However, national laws are not always effective in controlling
MNEs’ operations.4

1

Jose Engracia Antunes, The Liability of Polycorporate Enterprises, 13 CONN. J. INT’L L. 197, 203-204
(1999).
2
Tawny Aine Bridgeford, Note, Imputing Human Rights Obligations on Multinational Corporations:
The Ninth Circuit Strikes Again in Judicial Activism, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1009, 1015-16 (2003).
3
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, art.2 para. 2(b), G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR,
29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, UN Doc. A/9631 (1974), reprinted in 14 ILM 251 (1975).
4
Mark Gibney & R. David Emerick, The Extraterritorial Application of United States Law and the
Protection of Human Rights: Holding Multinational Corporations to Domestic and International
Standards, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 123, 123 (1996).

1

Presently, MNEs play an important role in the global economy. In
economic terms, they are as big as some countries,5 in some cases even
bigger,6 and they mobilize a great deal of capital through their
investments in different countries.7 They have accumulated so much
economic and political power that, in some instances, the host countries
are not in an equal position to bargain.8
A MNE’s wealth depends on its ability to access markets around the
world so that it can take advantage of lower costs of labor and raw
materials and of less restrictive laws.9 In turn, foreign direct investment
(FDI) by the MNE brings employment, technology, and capital to the host
country.10 Poor countries in need of FDI compete with each other to
attract those investments; in order to gain a competitive advantage, they
often lower their human rights and environmental standards and make
exceptions in the application of their laws and regulations.11 Not only are

5

See Antunes, supra note 1, at 203-204. For instance, the author points out that the annual revenue
of Standard Oil equals the gross domestic product (GDP) of Denmark, and the annual revenue of
IBM equals the GDP of Portugal and Norway.
6
See id. For instance, the author mentions that the annual revenue of General Motors is higher
than the GDP of Belgium. See also DETLEV F. VAGTS, WILLIAM S. DODGE & HAROLD HONGJU KOH,
TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS, 201 (3d ed. 2003). The authors label the comparison between
sales and GDP as misleading because “GDP is a measure of value added while sales are not”. And
under estimates of valued added, the authors shows that ExxonMobil is slightly larger than the
economy of Pakistan, and General Motors is slightly larger than the economy of Peru.
7
Id.
8
Douglas M. Branson, The Globalization of Corporate and Securities Law in the Twenty-First
Century: The Social Responsibility of Large Multinational Corporations, 16 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 121, 131
(2002).
9
Elisa Westfield, Note, Globalization, Governance, and Multinational Enterprise Responsibility:
Corporate Codes of Conduct in the 21st Century, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 1075, 1080-81 (2002).
10
See VAGTS, DODGE & KOH, supra note 6, at 204, analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of
FDI.
11
Meaghan Shaughenessy, Human Rights and the Environment: The United Nations Global Compact
and the Continuing Debate About the Effectiveness of Corporate Voluntary Codes of Conduct, 2000
COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 159, 161-62 (2000).

2

poor countries subject to pressure from other poor countries that engage
in the race to the bottom, but they also fear the relocation of MNEs, a
MNE power that acts as a “potent political force”12 in the FDI allocation
process. In sum, the concern is that both MNEs and poor countries may
favor lower standards; the former because such standards improve
production efficiency, the latter because the standards attract FDI.13
The debate concerning this issue started three decades ago,14 but
much has changed since then. In the beginning, host states were worried
that MNEs were not observing local laws.15 Now the interests are different,
and host countries, eager to obtain FDI, are more lenient toward MNEs; as
a result, “[MNEs] obey host country law, but they thereby ignore
international standards.”16 Accordingly, it can be inferred that the
interests of MNEs rarely match the interests of the general public, which in
turn is not always represented by the host country governments.17
The issue is highly controversial and subject to improvements at the
national and international levels, as well as in the private and public
spheres.

Two events occurred in the last decade that are significant

towards establishing greater responsibility of MNEs. The first event is the
12

Halina Ward, Securing Transnational Corporate Accountability Through National Courts:
Implications and Policy Options, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 451, 466 (2001).
13
Westfield, supra note 9, at 1081.
14
Seymour J. Rubin, Transnational Corporations and International Codes of Conduct: A Study of the
Relationship between International Legal Cooperation and Economic Development, 10 AM. U.J. INT’L
L. & POL’Y 1275, 1276 (1995).
15
Sydney M. Cone, III, et al., The Multinational Enterprise as Global Corporate Citizen, 21 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 26 (2001).
16
Id.
17
See Rubin, supra note 14, at 1278.
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proliferation of codes of conduct for MNEs that will be analyzed in Part II.
The second event is the wave of litigation that has taken place in the last
years, pressing for greater imputation of liability on MNEs, which will be
the object of study in Part III.

In Part IV, five recommendations are

proposed to achieve greater responsibility and accountability of MNEs. The
proposals are based on gaps in the status quo, analyzed in Parts II and
III, that impede adequate regulation of MNEs.
This thesis argues that an effective solution is possible only if host
countries jointly raise their low standards. In addition, it is suggested that
international organizations as well as MNE home countries can play an
important role in this process by ensuring that each country is effectively
enforcing the higher standards and MNEs are complying with host country
laws, and by exerting pressure when they are not. It is also proposed,
with the goal to promote the legal accountability of MNEs, that traditional
concepts of corporate law be adapted to new challenges that are
presented by MNEs, that host countries should ensure their nationals an
adequate forum to litigate against MNEs, and that the forum non
conveniens doctrines should employ a more sensitive criteria with
attention to the special circumstances of each case.

4

II. CODES OF CONDUCT

Before beginning the analysis, some clarifications are necessary.
Although the thesis refers to international standards in general, including
human rights, labor, and environmental standards, the thesis will omit
reference to specific environmental conventions to avoid a superficial
analysis of an extensive issue. The paper will also omit reference to codes
concerning specific sectors of industry18 even thought the standards are
more effectively addressed in a sector-by-sector basis; instead, the thesis
will focus only on those codes and conventions that address MNEs or
governments in general for the purpose of limiting the extension of the
analysis.

A. Regulation from International Organizations

It can be found some regulation and initiatives, regarding the
compliance of minimum standards and addressed to governments and/or
MNEs, within the ambit of the United Nations, the Organization for the
18

Examples of specific codes of conduct that were created within the ambit of the United Nations
are The International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes of 1981 by the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the International Code
of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides of 1985 by Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), which was amended in 1989.

5

Economic

Cooperation

and

Development,

the

International

Labor

Organizations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the
World Trade Organization.

1. Within the Ambit of the United Nations

The United Nations (UN) performed two works addressed to MNEs:
the Draft Code and the Global Compact. Although the Draft Code is
obsolete, it will be analyzed for its historic importance because it was the
first initiative in this direction and it is the start point of the conflicts of
interest between developed and developing countries that impede
consensus on imposing standards of conduct to MNEs.

a.

The Draft Code

In 1974, the UN reacted to the involvement of a MNE in the events
that led to the coup d’etat in Chile by setting up the Commission on
Transnational Corporations and the Information and Research Center on
Transnational Corporations.19 The action followed from the suggestions of
a report by the Group of Eminent Persons, which had been established by
the UN Secretary General and comprised representatives from developed
19

Kari Tapiola, The Importance of Standards and Corporate Responsibilities: The Role of Voluntary
Corporate Codes of Conduct 2 (OECD Conference, Paris, Sept. 20-21, 1999) available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/4/2089872.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2004).

6

and developing nations.20 The Commission had as a priority the
formulation of the Code of Conduct for MNEs, and among other tasks, the
enhancement of the bargaining power of poor countries in negotiations.21
The purposes of the Code included the following: “[to ensure] respect
for national sovereignty, [to] establish policies of countries in which
transnational corporations operate, … [to promote] the right of the host
countries to regulate and monitor transnational corporations activities [,]
to foster transnational corporations contributions to developmental goals
[,] to prohibit subversion or interference in the internal affairs of countries
and other inadmissible activities.”22
However, in the course of negotiations, lack of consensus relating to
the content of the Code, produced by conflicts of interest between rich
and poor countries, made clear that a binding code was legally and
politically infeasible.23 Later, structural changes and different priorities
made the Code obsolete.24
Developing countries initially viewed MNE activity as a way to impose
the MNEs’ home country policies and they wanted protection against that
kind of invasion.25 By the 1980s, however, their desire to obtain
investments from MNEs superseded their wish to regulate MNEs.26

20

Rubin, supra note 14, at 1282.
Id.
22
Id. at 1287.
23
Tapiola, supra note 19, at 2.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
21

7

The structure of MNEs has also undergone a major change “from
hierarchies to networks”; MNEs now have their offices all over the world,
home countries have lost their influence, the nationality of MNEs has
diminished in importance, and host countries’ fear of invasion of their
policies has faded.27
In 1982, an incomplete draft was published and continuously revised
until 1992 when negotiations were suspended.28 Actually, the draft “has
become a dead letter,” and a copy of it is extremely difficult to obtain.29

b. The Global Compact

After the unsuccessful attempt by the UN to make a binding code of
conduct for MNEs, the UN more recently developed the Global Compact
2000 (GC), by initiative of Secretary-General Kofi Annan, which invites
corporations to support ten key principles in the areas of human rights,
labor, environment and anti-corruption: to respect and support the
protection of human rights; to make sure not to be complicit to human
right abuses; to uphold freedom of association and recognition of the right
to collective bargaining; to eliminate forced and compulsory labor; to

27
28
29

Id. at 3.
VAGTS, DODGE & KOH, supra note 6, at 205.
Branson, supra note 8, at 136.
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abolish child labor30; to eliminate discrimination in employment; to
support the precautionary approach to environmental problems; to
promote greater environmental responsibility; to encourage and develop
the diffusion of environmental-friendly technologies; and to fight against
all forms of corruption, including bribery and extortion.31
In order to participate, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of each MNE
has to send a letter to the UN Secretary General expressing the MNE’s
support;

the

CEO

should

further

implement

changes

to

business

operations such that the principles becomes part of the strategy, culture,
and day-to-day operation of the MNE.32 In addition, the company must
publicly advocate the GC through press releases, speeches, etc., and
publish in its annual reports the ways in which it is supporting the GC and
its principles.33
In addition, the GC provides for annual Global Policy Dialogues,
action-oriented

meetings

that

focus

30

on

specific

issues

relating

to

The four principles relating to labor standards are better known as the “core labor standards” in
the international community due to their importance in this area. They were delineated in the
World Summit on Social Development, which took place in Copenhagen in March of 1995. See
Steve Charnovitz, Trade, Employment and Labor Standards: The OECD Study and Recent
Developments in the Trade and Labor Standards Debate, 11 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 131, 133.
(1997) (book review). A study conducted by the Organization for Economic Development and
Cooperation (OECD) in 1996 found that the core labor standards enhance economic efficiency. Id.
at 139-44.
31
See
The
Global
Compact:
The
Ten
Principles,
at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Portal/Default.asp (last visited July 30, 2004).
32
See The Global Compact: How to Participate in the Global Compact, at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Portal/Default.asp (last visited July 30, 2004).
33
Id.
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globalization and corporate citizenship, which provide some guidance to
MNEs the application of GC principles.34
The success of the GC relies completely on public accountability and
the self-interest of the corporations.

35

It is not a binding instrument, it

does not have mechanisms for the monitoring of the activity of
corporations

to

ensure

compliance

of

the

corporations

with

their

commitments, and it provides no sanctions for violations.36 In order to
ensure the enforcement of the GC, the UN can only persuade MNE
executives to adopt the principles or use negative publicity against the
MNEs.37
This UN initiative has been criticized for these weaknesses.38 Human
rights organizations generally have demanded mandatory compliance of
the GC or monitoring of MNEs’ performance.39 The Secretary General of
Amnesty International has said that, to gain credibility, the GC should at
least implement independent monitoring and make public the results.40
Critics also point out that many of the MNEs that are committed to the GC
were involved in abuses in the past; the MNEs nevertheless continue to
benefit from the good name of the UN, which should not be permitted.41

34
35

Id.

See
The
Global
Compact:
What
Is
the
Global
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Portal/Default.asp (last visited July 30, 2004).
36
Westfield, supra note 9, at 1091.
37
Id.
38
Shaughenessy, supra note 11, at 161.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
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Compact?

at

Nonetheless, the most important value of the GC resided in its
cooperative nature; the Compact involve the cooperation of corporations,
governments, labor organizations and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs).

2. Within the Ambit of the Organization for the Economic Cooperation and
Development

In the 1970s, the Organization for the Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) prepared a parallel work to the UN Code, the
Guidelines for MNEs, which was approved in 1976.42 The Guidelines were
later revised in 2000 incorporating standards that had been developed in
the previous two decades.43 Advancing the interests of developed
countries, which are the only members of the OECD and which also are
home countries of most MNEs, the Guidelines primarily aimed to achieve
the following goals: to improve the climate for investment, to prevent
discrimination against MNEs, to ensure that MNEs operate in harmony
with the governments of host countries, and to strengthen the mutual
confidence between MNEs and host country governments.44

42

VAGTS, DODGE & KOH, supra note 6, at 205.
Among the changes of the revision, the updated Guidelines promote the elimination of child labor
and forced labor; the environmental section now encourages MNEs to improve their environmental
performance; and there are two new chapters on consumer interests and on combating bribery.
44
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD, 10 (June 27, 2000), available at
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2000doc.nsf/4f7adc214b91a685c12569fa005d0ee7/c125692700623b
43

11

The principles promoted by the OECD, which correspond to the
policies enunciated in its Guidelines, are as follows: to contribute to
sustainable development, to respect human rights, to encourage human
capital formation, to promote self-regulatory practices, to abstain from
any improper involvement in political activities, and to respect local
laws.45 The principles also advocate more extensive disclosure to achieve
greater transparency in business, to combat bribery, and to support the
core

labor

standards.46

In

addition,

they

encourage

the

use

of

environmental-friendly practices and protect consumer interests.47 Finally,
they require MNEs to comply with the competition and taxation laws of
host countries.48
The Guidelines are “recommendations addressed by governments to
multinational enterprises.”49 They provide voluntary standards; however,
follow-up mechanisms substitute for the lack of binding obligations.50 The
OECD provides for regular reviews and discussions of cases with
recommendations from the Committee on International Investment and
MNE.51

74c125695400540788/$FILE/00082259.DOC (last visited Nov.24, 2004), reprinted in 40 I.L.M. 237
(2001) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines].
45
Id. at 12-13, reprinted in 40 I.L.M. at 240.
46
Id. at 15-20, reprinted in 40 I.L.M. at 240-46. It requires disclosure of information not only of
the MNE financial situation and performance, but also non-financial information such as
environmental and social reporting.
47
Id. at 18-19, reprinted in 40 I.L.M. at 243-45.
48
Id. at 23-24, reprinted in 40 I.L.M. at 246.
49
Id. at 12, reprinted in 40 I.L.M. at 237.
50
Tapiola, supra note 19, at 2.
51
Id. In the recommendations made by the Committee the name of the MNE involved cannot be
specified.

12

3. Within the Ambit of the International Labor Organization

In 1977, the International Labor Organization (ILO) adopted the
Tripartite Declaration on Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy,52
which would constitute the social and employment chapter of the UN
Code.53 Under the Tripartite Declaration, MNEs must guarantee the rights
to union activity and collective bargaining.54 The Tripartite Declaration is
also deals with health and safety issues, employment policy, training,
equality, and job security.55 And as the OECD Guidelines, this Declaration
provides only “guidelines” to MNEs, governments, and employers’ and
worker’s organizations.56
In order to monitor the compliance of the Tripartite Declaration, the
ILO conducts periodic surveys and the results are submitted to the ILO
Governing Body for further discussion.57
In case of disagreement about the application of the Tripartite
Declaration, the governments can submit a request for interpretation to
the ILO.58

52

Tripartite Declaration on Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, ILO (Nov. 1977) (amended
Nov.
2000)
[hereinafter
ILO
Tripartite
Declaration]
available
at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/multi/download/english.pdf (last visited Aug. 6,
2004).
53
Tapiola, supra note 19, at 2.
54
ILO Tripartite Declaration, supra note 52, at 8-10.
55
Id. at 4-8.
56
Id. at v.
57
Id.
58
Id.
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In 1998, the International Labor Conference adopted the ILO
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its followup mechanism, which specify the way in which countries must apply the
“core labor standards”,59 particularly highlighting the need to develop
promotional measures to support governments in their task. 60
More

interestingly,

the

1998

Declaration

is

addressed

to

governments instead of MNEs, placing the responsibility on states to adopt
the necessary regulations in their domestic laws in order to make MNEs
comply with the 1998 Declaration’s guidelines.61 The 1998 Declaration
nevertheless is a voluntary instrument despite efforts by unions and
developing countries to make it binding.62 Although it places duties on
states, it provides no sanctions for violations.63
Although the ILO principles are not corporate policies, in the long run,
it is expected that they will attain that status as governments incorporate
the principles into their domestic law ensuring that companies which
operate within the states’ territories comply with the principles.

59

64

See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
Westfield, supra note 9, at 1192. The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work
(June
1998)
available
at
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.static_jump?var_language=EN&var_pagename
=DECLARATIONTEXT (last visited Aug. 6, 2004); Follow-up to the Declaration (June 1988)
available
at
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.static_jump?var_language=EN&var_pagename
=DECLARATIONFOLLOWUP (last visited Aug. 6, 2004).
61
Tapiola, supra note 19, at 4.
62
Id.
63
Westfield, supra note 9, at 1192.
64
Id.
60
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ILO’s labor standards further have achieved general approbation
because they are established with the participation of unions, companies,
and local governments of developed and developing countries,65 and all of
the organization’s conventions have been approved by at least two-thirds
of its delegates.

66

4. Within Financial Organizations: the International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank

Both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB)
are extremely active in developing countries, although they have been
accused of having a “friendly” attitude towards MNEs since they promote
globalization and the reduction of obstacles impeding MNE activity.67 For
instance, during the Asian financial crisis, the IMF formulated a detailed
program that included a commitment of the Asian countries “to regulate
merchant banks, to eliminate various restrictions on foreign ownership of
domestic corporations, to permit foreign banks to establish subsidiaries in
the country, and to eliminate quotas, subsidies and other practices that
were inconsistent with the rules of the GATT/WTO system.”68

65
66
67
68

Id. at 1196.
Charnovitz, supra note 30, at 136.
Id.
VAGTS, DODGE & KOH, supra note 6, at 182.
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Critics considered the measures to be too intrusive, exceeding the
main function of the IMF, which is to balance payment adjustments.69
Advocates argued that the measures were necessary to obtain structural
changes of the evils that had caused the Asian crisis, such as “crony
capitalism, corruption, and weak regulation”.70
In reality, the IMF and the WB are able to exert great financial
pressure because countries that need loan reimbursements have to
commit to the institutions’ programs, which have been labeled as “the
Golden Straitjacket” by Thomas Friedman.71 The programs mainly require
from the governments: fiscal austerity, privatization of public enterprises,
modernization of economic laws, and elimination of corruption.72 The
conditions of the programs are primarily economic in character; they omit
any reference to human rights, labor, or environmental standards.73

5. Within the World Trade Organization

The relationship between trade and labor standards was part of the
debate of the first Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization

69
70
71
72
73

Id.
Id.
Branson, supra note 8, at 136-37.
Id. at 137.
Id.
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(WTO) in Singapore in 1996.74 Later, in 1999, the issue was again part of
the agenda in the WTO Seattle talks.75
The WTO has high enforcement potential because it can force states
to comply with minimum standards

“[b]y withholding most favored

nation status or participation in multinational trade agreements.”76
However, the different interests held by developed and developing
nations, as in the UN process, proved to be an obstacle against the
achievement of consent and the introduction minimum standards in the
agenda. In Singapore, the United States supported the introduction of
minimum standards, India and other developing countries opposed such
standards, and the EU remained divided.77 Trade ministers from Macau
and Uganda stated that the introduction of labor standards to the WTO
would have negative effects on the economy of poor countries.78
Developing countries did not trust developed countries; they saw the
attempt to introduce minimum standards as a “protectionism” measure
that would favor rich countries at the expense of poor countries.79 Since
the proposal for labor standards came from the United States, the Clinton
Administration's repeated anti-trade actions may have been a reason for
these concerns.80

74
75
76
77
78
79
80

Westfield, supra note 9, at 1076-77.
Id. at 1077.
Branson, supra note 8, at 138.
Westfield, supra note 9, at 1077.
Charnovitz, supra note 30, at 144.
Id.
Id. at 155.
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The result of the Singapore Conference was a broad declaration that
the WTO would "explore ways of enhancing cooperat[ion] with the ILO."81
Subsequently, WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero clarified that the
reference about the ILO only allows the WTO Secretariat to exchange
information between the organizations.82 In particular, the trade ministers
refused to establish a committee in trade and labor similar to the
Committee on Trade and Environment, which was created in 1994 to
analyze the relationship between trade and environmental agreements.83
Although it can be inferred from the WTO Singapore Declaration that
“the Ministerial did not consider the WTO a competent body capable to set
labor standards,”84 a positive change can be expected in the future if the
ILO take a more active role in enforcing labor standards. Indeed, even
though human rights and labor standards are not actually part of the WTO
agenda, among the issues included in the fourth WTO Ministerial
Conference in Doha of 2001 were the relationship between environment
and trade, as well as greater transparency in government.85

81
82
83
84
85

Singapore Ministerial Declaration, 36 I.L.M. 220, para 4. (1997) (adopted on Dec. 13, 1996).
Charnovitz, supra note 30, at 157-58.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 156.
VAGTS, DODGE & KOH, supra note 6, at 115.
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B. Efforts to Combat Bribery and Achieve Greater Transparency in
Transnational Business

Legislation to combat bribery and achieve greater transparency is
essential in order to ensure that the enforcement of human rights, labor,
and environmental standards is effective; otherwise, it will be easy for
MNEs to circumvent the legal system.
Corruption commonly affects developed as well as developing
countries, although in the latter the degree of corruption is higher because
weak legal systems, which is common in poor countries, contribute to it.86
The consequences of corrupt practices can be very dramatic. Many deaths
occurred around the world “due to the convergence of negligence,
inexperience, and corruption.”87
Bribery is the most common and major form of corruption. It can be
defined as “the conferral of a benefit to a public official in exchange for
abuse or misuse of that official's office.”88 And particularly, “transnational
bribery occurs when a businessperson from one country (the "home"
country) bribes a public official of another country (the "host" country).”89
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International

organizations

have

become

concerned

about

the

possible consequences of transnational bribery90 and some organizations
have reacted by asking their member states to enact legislation
criminalizing transnational bribery.91 Examples of these initiatives are the
UN

Declaration

Against

Corruption

and

Bribery

in

International

Commercial Transactions,92 the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions,93 the InterAmerican Convention Against Corruption,94 and the Convention on the
Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European Union
Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union.95
For instance, the Inter-American Convention requires its members to
allow the extradition of bribe-taking and bribe-giving officials,96 to
criminalize the officials’ assets that cannot be justified in relation to their
salaries during their terms,97 and to ban the use of the bank secrecy
defense in the course of investigations.98 The OECD Convention requires
its members to assist each other in investigations and to allow the
90

See id. (providing an analysis of the effects of bribery).
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extradition of violators.99 The OECD has been the most successful
initiative because, under the threat of its sanctions, almost all of its
members have enacted legislation to combat transnational bribery, and
such legislation is imminent in the remaining member states.100
In addition, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are
actively dealing with corruption, threatening to stop financial aid to bribesoliciting countries.101

The WTO also has created a Working Group on

Transparency in Government Procurement102 that is preparing a draft for
an agreement on transparency in government procurement.103
Even the International Chamber of Commerce had adopted in 1996
the Rules of Conduct to Combat Extortion and Bribery, a voluntary code of
corporate conduct. The Rules proscribe the demand or acceptance of any
bribe or kickback, request companies to control payments by their agents,
and require the maintenance of financial records to prevent the hiding of
illicit payments or secret funds.104
Recently, this concern has also reached the ambit of the Global
Compact. At the Leader Summit of June 24, 2004, UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan declared “[A]t your urging, and after extensive consultations
99
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with all participants that yielded overwhelming expressions of support, the
Global

Compact

henceforth

will

include

a

tenth

principle,

against

corruption, reflecting the recently adopted United Nations convention on
that subject.”

105

The tenth principle states, “Businesses should work

against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery.”106

C. Corporate Codes of Conduct

In the 1990s, MNEs started voluntarily adopting their own corporate
codes in reaction to the public demand for greater responsibility.107
Although these codes are merely self-regulation instruments, and MNEs
strongly advocate against binding codes, the spotlight effect acts as a
potent motivator of compliance.

1. The Spotlight Effect

Today there is a general interest in international business and MNE
behavior, and as a natural consequence, MNEs are much more sensitive to
public pressure of any kind. When companies invest abroad, they not only
bring their capital and technology to the host country but also their brand
105
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names, reputations, and international images.108 If they are caught
engaging in bad conduct, activist groups and the international media jump
into action with negative campaigns that can greatly affect a company,
especially if the company is involved in consumer products.109 As Bob
Hass, former CEO of Levi Strauss, once emphasized, “In today’s world, a
TV exposure on working conditions can undo years of effort to build brand
loyalty.”

110

Consumers will not buy a product that was made in violation of
human rights, labor, and environmental standards.111 A Corporate Edge
survey showed that “fifty eight percent of the consumers polled said they
would boycott a brand if they knew that a company was employing
children that make its product.”112 At this level, fifty-eight percent can
represent the loss of tons of money.
MNEs may stop doing business with abusive suppliers, and require
the suppliers to comply with their own corporate codes of conduct.113
Some MNEs have even withdrawn their operations from countries that
violate human rights and labor conditions.114

The MNEs do this not

because the morality of MNEs has changed, but because it is now in the
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MNEs’ economic benefit to do so. They are learning that what is at stake is
their “social license to operate.”115
It is undoubted that in the current economy, in competition among
MNEs, market behavior has become a deciding factor.116 Once MNEs have
agreed to comply with corporate codes, they will be forced to do it by the
market, not by the law117. For instance, a California consumer sued Nike
under the California’s Unfair Competition Law for making false statements
in its corporate code in regard to its labor practices abroad.118
The spotlight effect also balances “the fiduciary duties owed by
officers and directors, which mandates maximization of shareholder
wealth, to the exclusion of all other values,”

119

because MNEs still need to

support human and labor rights and environmental-friendly practices;
otherwise, a bad reputation in these areas could affect the shareholders’
wealth.
Nevertheless, MNEs do not always have a motivation to comply with
the corporate codes since they all lack the legal mechanisms to enforce
the codes, and if a MNE does not sell products directly to consumers, it is
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not subject to sufficient exposure to care about maintaining a good
reputation.120
The issue ultimately turns on a MNE’s skill at promotion and
marketing.121 The adoption of codes of conduct is used as a public
relations tool by many MNEs, creating a dichotomy between what they
claim they do and what they really do.122 Many MNEs have adopted their
own codes following a scandal in an effort to restore their public
images.123 Public relations specialists can change “the public perception of
MNEs” with a highly publicized program that advocates to global
responsibility.

124

Skeptics claim that codes do little to improve human

rights;125 they assert that many MNEs “don’t do anything with the
[codes]; they simply paste them on the walls to impress employees,
customers, suppliers and the public.”

126

2. MNEs’ Opposition to Binding Codes

On the other hand, MNEs contend that they are not only influenced
by consumer expectations; rather, they have another motivating interest

120

Shaughenessy, supra note 11, at 163.
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id. For instance, the author mentions Levi Strauss, Sears, J.C. Penney, Wall-Mart, Phillips-Van
Heusen, The Gap, Nike, Reebok, and Timberland, as companies that adopted their own corporate
codes after negative publicity of forced labor in China and child labor in Southeast Asia.
124
Westfield, supra note 9, at 1100.
125
Id.
126
Shaughenessy, supra note 11, at 163.
121

25

related to their recruiter efforts, in gaining a good reputation.127 They
admit that no company would emphasize that its only interest rests in
maximizing profits because companies are recruiting everywhere and
nobody wants to work for a bad company.128 Companies strongly maintain
that they take a lot of pride when they work with high standards, which
bring value to the company.129
However, MNEs continue to oppose any attempts to make corporate
codes binding, arguing, “[S]omething that is good investment towards the
value creating potential of the company will be regarded as a cost, an
expense that needs to be minimized.”130 MNEs further argue that if the
codes are mandatory, it would limit their ability to adapt their standards
to varying competitive conditions in the different markets, which can place
them at a disadvantage to MNEs that do not comply with the mandatory
codes or to domestic companies that only comply with the low standards
of host countries.131 They also fear that the creation of governmental
organs to monitor their compliance with the codes “would lead to
bureaucratic

administration

replacing

market

mechanisms.”132

MNE

executives emphasize that more can be achieved by promoting voluntary
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codes of conduct and by encouraging enterprises to be a role model for
the other MNEs.133

D. Challenges
There

are

three

obstacles

that

impede

the

effectiveness

of

international regulations and corporate codes: the lack of consensus on
minimum standards, the lack of enforcement and monitoring mechanisms
and the controversy whether MNEs can be actors of international law.

1. Consensus on Minimum Standards

An adequate way for a MNE to avoid bad publicity and litigation is to
make sure that the best possible standards apply wherever the MNE
operates, at home as well as abroad.134 Nevertheless, that would be an
unrealistic solution due to differences in the standards adopted in the
home country and in the host country.135
Host countries often have deliberately adopted lower standards to
attract investment, and MNEs take advantage of this race to the bottom in
order to remain competitive and to maximize their profits.
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136

There is a need to set minimum standards in order to level the
playing field. Such standards will not be produced by the market alone.137
An internationally coordinated approach would be necessary to ensure
that regulation is effective, at least creating general consensus in the
minimum standards.138
Moreover, the standards generally found in international or corporate
codes are too broad to be applied, and in some cases, there is no
consensus about the exact standards. For instance, it is not clear yet if
MNEs should have an active role doing good things or if they simply
should avoid doing wrong.139 There is general consensus that MNEs should
not be complicit to human right violations but the type of behavior which
will make MNEs complicit is unsettled.140 There is a great need to be more
specific about what these standards are to ensure compliance.

2. Enforcement and Monitoring Mechanisms

Since

all

of

the

corporate

codes

developed

by

international

organizations have a promotional rather than normative character, mainly
137
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conceived as guidelines or models for MNEs corporate codes, they entrust
the enforcement of the corporate codes to the MNEs themselves.141 The
delegation of enforcement to the MNEs themselves provides no guarantee
that there will be any compliance at all; and even if MNEs comply, they
may adopt different degrees of compliance with their codes, which will
lead to a consisting lowering of standards because MNE that lose business
“by applying more powerful enforcement mechanisms will be replaced by
companies with less effective enforcement procedures.”142
The corporate codes are essentially “statement[s] of intent”; only if
they are enforced and monitored they become real rules.143 It is important
that the monitoring function is external to the company and that the
results are made public. If that information is available to the public,
consumers and investors will be able to make smart decisions in the way
they want to spend or invest their money,144 and public exposure can be
an incentive for MNEs to do their best to comply with their codes.

3. Placement of MNEs as Actors of the International Law

In order to make a valid claim that MNEs do not comply with
international law, it first has to be determined whether international law

141
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can impose rights and duties on MNEs, as is done the case with states.145
The genesis of this phenomenon may be found in the privatization
process, where there has been a shift of roles; MNEs have started doing
what the government used to do, and as a consequence, now the
complaints are directed against MNEs in the same way that they used to
be

directed

against

governments

for

human

rights

violations.146

Confronted with the passive attitude of the states, “individuals are taking
the law in their own hands”147 trying to hold MNEs responsible, and
supporting the creation of greater MNE rights and obligations.148 Through
these efforts, individuals are bringing international law into the domestic
arena, and the international law is becoming “privatized” because private
actors (individuals and MNEs) are becoming both agents and subjects of
international law.149
Affirmative

support

for

the

view

of

MNEs

as

actors

under

international law is particularly reasonable in consideration of the
precedents

in

that

direction.150

For

instance,

many

international

environmental law treaties hold “polluters” liable for the environmental
harm that they cause, and the new international regime on bribery places
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duties on corporations.151 MNEs also already have certain rights at the
international level, such as the right to seek arbitration under bilateral
investment agreements, and the right to assert claims against a
government for violations of free speech or other human rights.152
Although

the

development

of

greater

MNEs

duties

under

international law is highly desirable and certainly possible in the future,
the solutions proposed by this thesis will focus on the regulation of MNEs
by national laws because domestic regulation is a prerequisite to
international consensus on the development of international regulation.
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III. LITIGATION AGAINST MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES

Although

MNEs

actually

have

some

rights

and

duties

under

international law, no international forum exists that can hold a MNE
accountable for its business activities.153 The only way to do this is
through the judicial system of local governments, where the violation took
place or where the parent company is located, for violations of
international law which have been incorporated into domestic laws or into
treaties signed by the country where the forum is located.154
In the last few years, there has been a wave of claims against parent
companies for the conduct of their subsidiaries abroad.155 After all, each
state “has the authority to control the way in which its nationals interact
with other states,”156 and each state can regulate the activity of its
corporations abroad by enacting extraterritorial laws.157
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A. The Value of Litigation Against MNEs

Litigation against MNEs for their conduct abroad, as well as
regulation, is an important factor in modifying the conduct of MNEs.158 It
is in the MNEs’ own interest to avoid litigation due to the likely drop in
share price as a result of the threat of liability.159 Litigation also levels the
playing field since it reaches not only public brands but also those
companies that are not harmed by a bad reputation since they don’t have
consumer products. 160 In addition, litigation is a solution against the claim
that corporate codes are used as a public relations tool because it can
uncover discrepancies between what MNEs say they do and what they
really do.161 Finally, the general public pays extremely close attention to
such cases, which undoubtedly can trigger an adverse impact on the
reputation of the brands involved, which in turn can motivate a change in
business practices.162
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B. The Type of Litigation and Its Causes

The MNEs’ immortality, wealth, and size make them attractive
defendants.

163

Some actions are initiated for human rights abuses or

exploitation of workers; others focus on environmental damage or lack of
respect and harm done to the culture of indigenous populations.164 Other
claims are based on lack of transparency and non-compliance with
domestic and international laws.165
In some cases, litigation against a parent company for the acts of its
subsidiary abroad happens simply because the subsidiary responsible for
the damages no longer exists and the only way to recover damages is to
go after the parent company.166 The Holocaust and World War II cases
present such a situation since the events happened more than fifty years
ago, and the MNEs involved are the only responsible parties still available
for suit.167
However, in most cases, this litigation occurs due to differences
between the legal systems of the home country and the host country, as
well as governance deficiencies in the latter.168 Among the differences in
legal systems, some home countries offer the possibility of a higher
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recovery.169 For instance, the United States, the home of many MNEs, is
the most attractive forum in which to litigate because of the many
procedural advantages that it offers, such as broad discovery, contingent
fee arrangements, and the possibility of a civil jury.170
The advantages that are offered by the U.S. legal system not only are
pro-plaintiff; in some instances, they make possible litigation of claims for
which the plaintiff would have no remedy in other forums. The right to
trial by jury is also favorable to the plaintiff since American jurors come
from very different backgrounds than professional judges and they tend to
be more sensitive to the plaintiff’s claims.171 Furthermore, juries generally
give bigger awards than judges.172 The contingent fee, whereby the
lawyer will only be paid a portion of the award if he wins the case,
moreover makes possible litigation by poor plaintiffs and by the riskadverse plaintiff who then would have nothing to lose.173 Finally,
procedural rules permit plaintiff to assert vague claims, with little
evidence, and later substantiate his claim through the use of the broad

169

Id. at 462.
Donna Solen, Forum Non Conveniens and the International Plaintiff, 9 FLA. J. INT'L L. 343, 343
(1994).
171
Daniel J. Dorward, The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine and the Judicial Protection of
Multinational Corporations from Forum Shopping Plaintiffs, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 141, 147
(1998).
172
Id.
173
Id. at 148; see also Ugo Mattei & Jeffrey Lena, U.S. Jurisdiction Over Conflicts Arising Outside of
the United States: Some Hegemonic Implications, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 381, 393-94
(2001); see also Stephens, supra note 155, at 411-12 (examining law firms’ interests and the way
they face this kind of lawsuit).
170

35

discovery rules,174 which make available information that otherwise would
be out of the plaintiff’s reach.

175

In contrast, host countries often lack the financial and legal
resources necessary to guarantee justice in a particular case. One typical
example is the unavailability of class action suits, which is an American
device that “offers a means of disposing of sometimes hundreds of
thousands of claims in one trial, with the sole remaining issue being proof
of damages.”176 In the Aguinda case,177 for example, thousands of
Ecuadorian indigenous people sued Texaco in the United States because
class actions suits are unavailable in Ecuador.178
Nevertheless, a major problem remains the fact that plaintiffs are
intimidated to look for justice in their own forums because developing
countries are blemished with corruption.179 Although MNEs could try to
avoid litigation by applying good standards; they also could simply
relocate their plants to host countries where the risk of liability is
smaller.180 Due to the economic interests involved, the threat of relocation
can corrupt the administration of justice in host countries and further
diminished the protection afforded to host countries nationals. In some
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cases, the lack of impartiality is more evident when the government is
involved in MNE operations, acting as a business partner of a MNE.181

C. Obstacles

Although litigation is a useful way to influence MNEs to operate with
care, a plaintiff has to overcome many hurdles.182 First, if a subsidiary no
longer exists or does not have enough assets, it can be very difficult to
reach the parent company under the “separate entities” principle. Second,
the plaintiff has to litigate in a forum with both subject matter and
personal jurisdiction over the defendant; in addition, if the judgment has
to be enforced in another forum, the plaintiff has to determine whether
the second forum will recognize the jurisdiction and decision of the first
forum.183 Third, even if a common law forum has jurisdiction, the case still
can be dismissed under forum non conveniens grounds. A defendant also
may assert non-justiciability, whereby a judge may dismiss a case if it
finds that a judicial decision would interfere with the authority of the
political branches.184 In the end, a plaintiff may have no legal remedies
due to all these obstacles.
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1. Limits of Traditional Corporate Law

Corporate law has undergone substantial evolution. Commercial
activity originally was only regulated by the laws of commerce and the
company was identified with the owner of the business, who was
personally liable for all of the debts of the company.

185

The modern

corporate law of most Western countries employs the separate entity
principle, which recognizes that that the corporation and its shareholders
are separate juridical entities, and the debts and liabilities of the
corporation

are

separate

from

the

debts

and

liabilities

of

its

shareholders.186
Moreover, the concept of the limited liability makes shareholders
liable for the corporate debts only to the extent of their investment.187 It
is remarkable the fact that the limit liability doctrine was created latter
and is different from the separate entity principle.188 The concept was
developed for political reasons as an incentive for investments through the
insulation of shareholders from the risks of business.189 In that time, only
individuals

were

able

to

be

shareholders;
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shareholders expanded to include corporations, corporate law extended
the same principles to corporate groups.190 Indeed, the liability insulation
is the reason that many companies have chosen to expand their business
through the formation of subsidiaries instead of branches.191
Nevertheless, the traditional concept of a corporate entity differs
from the reality of modern corporations.192 While the public views each
MNE as one firm, the law regards each MNE as several entities that
comprise a corporate group.193 The dichotomy impedes the imposition of
liability on MNEs because under the law each subsidiary entity is
responsible for its own obligations,194 an advantage that has been abused
by MNE through the creation of multiple entities within each corporate
group.
However, the law has not been completely blind to this situation; to
prevent manipulation by MNEs in an attempt to evade the liability,
corporate law has started to treat the different entities of a corporate
group as a single enterprise in areas such as taxation, labor, bribery,
antitrust, etc.195 Nevertheless, the approaches adopted by different legal
systems to adapt the law to the new realities have differed and are far
from perfect.
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a. Comparative Law

In most common and civil law countries, limited liability is the rule;
only under exceptional circumstances will it be set aside to pierce the
corporate veil.196 The doctrine has been applied with mixed results due to
difficulties in determining the line between liability and non-liability,
however, and this has led to complete unpredictability in the resolution of
cases.197
As a revolutionary approach, the EU proposed the “economic unit
theory” which imposes unlimited liability on the parent company for the
actions of its subsidiary depending on the amount of corporate control.198
EU courts treat the different entities as one enterprise if they are under
the control and management of the same shareholders.199 The theory’s
weakness resides in the rigidity of its approach, which exposes parent
companies to the possibility of constant litigation and forecloses the
chance of exoneration even in cases where the parent company clearly
was not at fault.200
Some legal systems have resolved these problems by adopting a
dualist approach.201 For instance, the German system distinguishes
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between “contractual groups” and “factual groups.” In the first group, a
contract recognizes the parent control, and the parent company will
always be liable for the debts of its subsidiary.202 On the other hand, in
the second group, the parent exercises de facto control and is held liable
only when the corporate debts originated from situations where the parent
has effectively exercised control.203 The problem is that the reality of the
organizational structures of specific companies does not always converge
with the legal models.204
None of these approaches works without failure. Their common
failure is to oversimplify a complex issue which requires a flexible legal
system that analyzes each situation case-by-case.205

b. The Doctrine of the Corporate Veil

MNEs

“operating

through

a

parent/subsidiary

hierarchical

infrastructure, can create corporate layers and a presence dispersed
through numerous states,”206 which can facilitate the insulation of liability
of a MNE because in most Western countries the corporate law sees as
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many entities as are found in an enterprise, and each entity is only liable
for the conduct of its own officers and employees.207
Nevertheless, courts have overridden this general rule under
exceptional circumstances by piercing the corporate veil to make the
parent company responsible for the acts of its subsidiaries.208 The
rationale for this practice recognizes that “a corporation will be looked
upon as a legal entity as a general rule . . . but, when the notion of legal
entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or
defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of
persons.”

209

Courts have pierced the corporate veil when they have found that the
parent company owns and controls the subsidiary to the extent that the
subsidiary is relegated to the status of a mere instrument or “alter ego” of
the parent.210 Other reasons that have justified the exception are fraud,
misrepresentation, undercapitalization, and lack of corporate forms.211
However, courts have not always agreed that each reason alone is strong
enough to pierce the corporate veil.212
There is general consensus that the main analysis should focus on the
level of control exerted by the parent, that is, the extent to which the
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parent has had a direct intervention in the daily activity of its
subsidiary.213 It is not enough that the parent owns the subsidiary or has
an ability to control it because, in order to make the parent liable, the
parent has to actually exercise control.214
The Indian Court reached this conclusion in the Bhopal Case when it
decided to lift the corporate veil of Union Carbide Corporation (UCC).215 In
1984 a leak of lethal gas from a pesticide factory in Bhopal caused injuries
to more than 200,000 people and the death of 200 people. The pesticide
factory belonged to Union Carbide India, Ltd., (UCI) a company
incorporated in India with the following ownership: 50.9% by UCC, an
American company; 22% by the Indian government; and 27.1% publicly
held.216 The Indian court concluded that UCC had control over UCI
because there was no doubt that (1) UCC held the majority of the share
capital of UCI at all times and (2) UCC had the total voting power over
UCI at all times, controlling not only the Board of Directors of UCI but also
its management. Therefore, the court concluded it was permissible to
pierce the corporate veil and make UCC responsible for the tort, especially
considering that the assets of UCI were insufficient to meet the claims.217
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Nevertheless, courts rarely pierce the corporate veil because the
social benefits of the limited liability doctrine outweigh its costs.218 As
previously mentioned, the main goal of the doctrine of limited liability is to
reduce financial risks for shareholders in order to encourage more risktaking investments in the market.

219

Following this policy, courts have

rejected the argument that it should pierce the corporate veil simply
because the parent organized the subsidiary with the intent of limiting its
own liability, stating that there is nothing illegal about using the corporate
form to limit liability.220
The frequent use of the limited liability doctrine to shield the liability
of a MNE is reproachable because usually MNEs are wholly controlled by
their parent companies.221 It is often between the top executives that the
major decisions are taken to establish the policies and strategies, and to
supervise and approve the subsidiaries’ operations abroad.222

2. Jurisdiction Issues

In the European Union, the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters establishes
218
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general principles of jurisdiction that focus on the domicile of the
defendant, the place of incorporation of the corporation, or the location of
the events at issue in the lawsuit.223 Under the Brussels Convention, aside
from suit against the defendant in the forum of his domicile, the litigation
can only take place in a forum if the event took place there.224 Although
English courts used to ignore the domicile principle, dismissing under
forum non conveniens grounds when the alternative court was in a
country which was not a member of the European Union,225 a ruling of the
European Court of Justice four years ago established that the domicile
principle has to be applied “even if the plaintiff is domiciled in a nonmember country.”226
In the United States, the basis for jurisdiction is more liberal and was
established by two landmark cases.227 In International Shoe Co. v.
Washington,228 the Supreme Court established that “minimum contacts”
were

enough

to

establish jurisdiction

over

an

absent

defendant;

nevertheless, its exercise should comply with “traditional notions of fair
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play and substantial justice” in order to respect constitutional due
process.229 Subsequently, in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. California,230 the
court held that jurisdiction should be exercised in a “reasonable” manner.
The U.S. rules permit litigation in the United States against defendants
who are transient, if they are served during their stay, and against foreign
corporations that are doing business in the United States.231 Moreover,
U.S. jurisdiction principles do “not require a finding of a connection
between the events at issue and the U.S.”232 Nevertheless, U.S. courts will
have to take into account, before accepting jurisdiction, the fact that it is
very unlikely that most courts of the world would enforce judgments from
United States against non-American defendants for events that happened
abroad.233
Although the broad U.S. rules may offer extensive jurisdiction in
comparison

with

most

Western

countries,

some

countries

have

jurisdictional principles that may seem too excessive even in comparison
to the American view.234 For instance, in France, citizens can bring
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litigation against any defendants for any cause. Some countries also allow
lawsuits against a defendant whose property is located in the forum.235
Not only must courts have personal jurisdiction over the defendant
to hear the case, they also must have subject matter jurisdiction. The
plaintiff must assert “claims cognizable in the particular court system;”236
in other words, the claims must “fall within recognized causes of
action.”237
In the human rights area, the U.S. Alien Tort Statute provides that
“[d]istrict courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.”238 The act provides a foreign plaintiff with a
federal forum for torts that are violations of customary international law
committed in anyplace around the world.239 Its importance resides in the
fact that most violations of human rights are committed by the victims’
governments, sometimes in conjunction with MNEs, and therefore, foreign
plaintiffs may find it impossible to bring actions at home.240
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An example of this type of suit is Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co.,241 in which Shell was accused of instigating the Nigerian government
to torture and kill local leaders who opposed oil exploitation. Another case
is Doe v. Unocal Corp.,242 in which Unocal was accused of aiding and
abetting the de facto government of Burma in its human rights violations
(forced relocation of villagers, confiscation of property, forced labor, and
rape of women) during the construction of a pipeline.
The statute has been strictly construed permitting consideration only
of violations of human rights that are universally condemned such as
torture, murder, genocide, and slavery.243 It remains to be seen if in the
future

the

scope

of

the

statute

will

be

extended

to

labor

and

environmental violations, which may be possible once the international
community has reached consensus regarding standards in those areas.

3. The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine

The doctrine of forum non conveniens is another obstacle faced by
foreign plaintiffs trying to litigate in common law countries that are home
countries of the MNEs.244 The doctrine basically allows the court to refuse
to hear the case, even when it has subject matter and personal
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jurisdiction, when there is another place more appropriate to litigate, such
as in the country where the events occurred.245
The doctrine developed in the United States to counter-balance the
broad American standards that established personal jurisdiction.246 The
doctrine arose as an exception to the requirement that a court must hear
a case once jurisdiction has been established, when “the plaintiff's forum
choice was so egregiously inappropriate as to appear motivated by a
desire to vex and harass the defendant.”247
However, the modern American doctrine leans towards a more
discretionary facet established by two key cases at the federal level: Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert248 and Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.249
In the Gulf Oil case, the Supreme Court emphasized that the
doctrine leaves much to the discretion of the court.250 It also created a
balancing test, whereby a court takes into account private interests of the
litigant as well as public interests of the court and community.251 Among
the private interests, the court mentioned the cost of attendance of willing
witnesses, availability of compulsatory processes to ensure cooperation by
unwilling witnesses, access to sources of proof, and enforceability of the

245
246
247
248
249
250
251

Ward, supra note 12, at 460.
Reed, supra note 206, at 35-36.
Id. at 38.
330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947)
454 U.S. 235 (1981)
Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508.
Id. at 508-09.

49

judgment.252

Among

the

public

interests,

the

court

included

the

administrative difficulties of overburdened courts and the interest of the
country where the violation occurred to have the case heard at home.253
The Gulf Oil case also established a presumption in favor of the plaintiff,
declaring that the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed
unless the balance of interests is strongly in favor of the defendant.254
Years later, in the Piper Aircraft case, the Supreme Court reinforced
what it already had said in the Gulf Oil case with respect to the discretion
of the court, declaring that the court’s decision can only be reversed when
there is a clear abuse of discretion,255 eliminating almost any chance to
appeal a dismissal based on forum non conveniens grounds. Moreover,
after this, “appellate courts have little power to create uniformity,”256 and
since the balance of interest is left to the court’s discretion, there is great
uncertainty concerning how a court is going to apply the doctrine in each
particular case.
While the Gulf Oil case involved only U.S. citizens, the Piper Aircraft
case involved foreign plaintiffs,257 a reason why the court probably ruled
that the presumption in favor of the plaintiff deserves less deference when
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the plaintiff is an alien.

258

The court also stated that the plaintiff will not

defeat a forum non conveniens dismissal by merely showing that the law
that would be applied in the foreign forum is less favorable to the
plaintiff.259
Probably the most important public interest is the interest of the
foreign country in having its local controversies heard at home, which is
known as “judicial comity.” It is basically an act of deference from the
court to the foreign country.260 The court has to decide if “there is
sufficient local interest in the foreign forum to justify having the case
decided there.”261 From the court’s perspective, to retain jurisdiction in
those cases would be seen as an act of imperialism whereby a sovereign
imposed its own standards and rules on the country where the appropriate
forum is located.262 However, it is ironic that the American court in the
Bhopal case263 gave great weight to this interest, while the Indian
government showed a clear interest in having the case heard in the United
States.264 The American court hardly showed respect for India’s interest.
At the U.S. state level, the doctrine has not always been used in the
same way as at the federal level, but in the last few years, there has been
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greater adherence to the federal approach.265 In Dow Chemical Co. v.
Castro Alfaro,266 eighty-two Costa Rican plantation workers brought an
action in Texas claiming that they had suffered personal injuries, including
sterility and cancer, caused by their exposure to a pesticide manufactured
by Dow Chemical Company and Shell Oil, both U.S.-based multinational
companies. The pesticide had been banned in the United States more than
a decade previously because of the dangerous consequences to human
health. The Texas Supreme Court held that forum non conveniens would
not be a bar to wrongful death and personal injury actions arising in a
foreign state.267 Nevertheless, shortly after this case, the Texas legislature
enacted a bill that overruled the case as a result of strong lobbying by the
corporate sector.268
On the other hand, Australian courts have upheld the original goal of
the forum non conveniens doctrine by dismissing only those cases that do
not belong to its courts, and applying the doctrine only in exceptional
circumstances.269

England270

and

Ireland

have

adopted

the

same

discretionary American approach, which places them in clear conflict with
the principles set out in the Brussels Convention.271
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The doctrine is used to combat forum shopping exercised by some
lawyers to take advantage of higher awards.272 However, the practice of
dismissing cases to prevent forum shopping is questionable because the
lawyers are only trying to do their job effectively by choosing the most
favorable forum for their clients.273 Moreover, in certain circumstances
under the special circumstances of the case the lawyers have no real
choice of an alternative forum for their clients.274
Unfortunately, the Anglo-American doctrine is used by MNEs to
escape liability for their conduct abroad, leaving some foreign plaintiffs
with no other remedy, since substantial and procedural differences
between forums, not to mention the corruption factor, can make the
litigation possible only in the forum in which the litigation had been
dismissed. In fact, only a very small percentage of cases are pursued in
foreign forums once they have been dismissed.275

MNE lawyers spend

much time and money on their arguments to have a case dismissed
because they know that once the case is dismissed, the lawsuit is
practically over.276
It is very controversial when this doctrine is invoked by MNEs against
foreign plaintiffs since it seems that injuries done by corporations of the
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forum to foreign nationals abroad are not the forum’s problem.277 There is
no doubt that courts exercise open discrimination against foreign
plaintiffs.278 By dismissing such cases on the forum non conveniens
ground,

common

law

courts

are

closing

their

eyes

to

corporate

malpractice, negligence, and harmful conduct. For instance, it should be of
great concern that some MNEs sell to foreign poor countries products that
have been prohibited in their home countries, using these developing
countries as the “industrial world’s garbage can.”279 There are also claims
that MNEs engage in systematic degradation of the environment, or do not
act with reasonable care when they use production plants that emit levels
of sulfur dioxide at many times above what is acceptable under their
home country laws.280 Even worse are the accusations against MNEs that
act in concert with governments that violate human rights.281 Such MNE
conduct will continue because the MNE’s wrongdoings are not punished by
their home countries or by the host countries, 282 allowing MNEs to benefit
from the “best of both worlds.”283 These concerns have been clearly
expressed by the Dow Chemical court:
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Some
undoubtedly
environment

United

States

continue
with

multinational

to

endanger

such

activities

corporations

human
until

life
the

and

will
the

economic

consequences of these actions are such that it becomes
unprofitable to operate in this manner. When a court dismisses
a case against a United States multinational corporation, it
often removes the most effective restraint on corporate
misconduct ... In the absence of meaningful tort liability in the
United States for their actions, some will continue to operate
without adequate regard for the human and environmental
costs of their actions. This result cannot be allowed ...284
Although it is the responsibility of host countries to fashion
regulations that include acceptable standards, and to provide courts that
allow its citizens to legitimately sue MNEs, the race to the bottom in which
they are engaged makes the responsibility an illusion.285 In their
competition to attract investments,

“the government that offers the

lowest potential tort and environmental liability wins.”286 MNEs avoid
countries with rigorous regulations, and are able to shop for jurisdictions
that lack standards or have low standards, where individuals have limited
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access to courts.287 This lack of a legal infrastructure translates into lower
costs and bigger profits for MNEs.
To avoid the difficulties in overcoming the separate legal entities
principle and the forum non conveniens dismissal, plaintiff’s lawyers have
started to make allegations that focus on the actions of the parent itself,
as the entity that set the policies and supervised the operations of its
subsidiary.288 This strategy was used in the Aguinda case, in which it was
alleged that the operational decisions that caused the injuries in Ecuador
were made in Texaco’s headquarters in New York.289
In order to reduce the discretionary power of U.S. courts to dismiss
cases under the forum non conveniens doctrine, governments in Latin
America

have

enacted

laws290

that

eliminate

the

subject-matter

jurisdiction of cases against American MNEs in Latin American courts.291
With this strategy, they try to help their nationals to gain access to U.S.
courts by making their local forum unavailable and thereby lessening the
possibility of dismissal under forum non conveniens grounds in U.S.
courts.292
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Developing Countries Should Jointly Raise Their Standards293

It is very tempting to dream of an international convention, whereby
all of the countries of the world would adopt the same standards.
Nevertheless, the experiences of the UN and WTO have demonstrated that
it is impossible for rich and poor countries to reach consensus because of
their different interests and circumstances. Therefore, a more realistic
solution is a convention among developing countries; because they share
the same interests, they may more quickly reach a consensus on
minimum standards.
The advantages of the suggested solution become clearer if two other
proposals are discharged: first, that MNEs should control the setting of
minimum standards, and second, that home countries
The first proposal favoring standard-setting by MNEs is based on the
argument that they have so much economic and political power that it is
their moral duty to provoke the setting of minimum standards, influencing
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not only host countries but also others MNEs.294 Although few MNEs would
admit that they are only interested in making profits, it would be
unrealistic to believe that MNEs have to opt between adopting the best
practice and taking advantage of lower standards.295
For instance, Lewis Strauss (Lewis) was the first company to adopt a
corporate code that afterwards served as a model for other MNE corporate
codes.296 In 1993, following the guidance of its corporate code, the
company closed its plants in China in response to reports of human rights
abuses in that country.297 No other company followed this action, and
while they continued to benefit from the lower standards in China, Lewis
lost a core market.298 Three years later, Lewis revised its code, deleting
the provision that mandated the termination of business in countries in
which there are human rights abuses.299 Shortly thereafter, Lewis
reopened again its plants in China.300
The experience of Lewis shows that even the willingness of a MNE to
do the right thing is not enough.301 If they try to adopt higher standards,
they are destined to fail competitively.302 While there still are countries
with lower standards, there will always be a MNE that takes advantage of
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such standards. Therefore, an effective solution must come from host
countries.
Some scholars have suggested a second proposal, whereby home
countries legislate extraterritorial regulations for their MNEs which would
be applicable at home as well as abroad.303 The problem with this
approach is that the regulation of higher standards by home countries will
place their MNEs operating abroad at a competitive disadvantage with
respect to other MNEs, which are not subject to those standards by their
governments.304 In addition, extraterritorial legislation could be seen as an
invasive practice of the home countries by host countries that deliberately
choose low standards; host countries could even claim that home
countries are not respecting their sovereign rights.305 After all, “the
general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful
or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where
the act is done.”306
Having demonstrated the weaknesses of these proposals, it is clear
that the only effective and legitimate way to ensure an effective resolution
of the lack of standards or low standards is for host countries to set
minimum standards. The Treaty of Versailles of 1919 declared, “The
failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle
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in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their
own countries.”307 Although the treaty referred only to labor standards,
the statement could also be extended to human rights and environmental
standards. Individual states would not unilaterally adopt higher standards
because they would lose investments in favor of those states that
maintained low standards. However if all of the states agreed to raise
standards, then it would be a win-win situation for every state since each
state would compete to attract investment from an equal position thereby
ensuring a level playing field.
This argument further supported by the reality that if host countries
do not protect their labor force, the human rights of their nationals, and
their environment, why should anyone else do it? After all, an inherent
duty of any state is the protection of its nationals. Moreover, the threat of
MNE relocation, which is the main fear of poor countries, would be
eliminated if all of the poor countries together adopt higher standards.
Finally, poor countries again would hold the balance of power which is now
in the powerful hands of MNEs.
In this context, it is essential that the same standards apply to MNEs
as well as to domestic corporations; such practice would be in accordance
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with the notion of “national treatment” which imprints most trade and
investment liberalization.308

B. Emphasis on Enforcement Mechanisms

There are three types of enforcement mechanisms: internal selfenforcement,

vertical

enforcement,

and

horizontal

enforcement.309

Internal self-enforcement, executed by the state itself, is the most
important type of enforcement since violations generally occur within a
state.310

Vertical

enforcement

is

controlled

by

intergovernmental

organizations that can influence a government to end violations.311 Lastly,
horizontal enforcement is done by other states that can exert pressure
against a violator.312
The

proposed

approach

will

center

mainly

on

internal

self-

enforcement, but since it is known that certain governments could not be
trusted to comply with these standards, they need exterior pressures.
Vertical and horizontal enforcement thus can help to ensure the
governments’ compliance.
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1.

Internal

Self-Enforcement:

The

Monitoring

and

Enforcement

of

Corporate Codes Should Be Mainly in the Charge of National Authorities

Regulations concerning a specific issue require both norm enunciation
and an enforcement mechanism.313 Once developing countries have
agreed to adopt minimum standards, and assuming that developed
countries continue to maintain their higher standards, the countries should
compile their standards in a national model code, which would serve as a
guideline for voluntary corporate codes. Therefore, corporations would be
free to adopt their own codes as long as they incorporated the minimum
standards. The proposed solution thereby would avoid any controversy
about “binding” codes. Three decades of experience have shown that
conflicts of interest make a “binding” legal instrument for MNEs an illusory
goal, but if MNEs and national authorities focus on the effectiveness of the
codes, “it may blur the distinction between a voluntary and a binding
code.”314

Once corporations have adopted their codes, local authorities

thus should assure compliance with the codes by providing incentives and
by monitoring them MNE activity.
Governments should reward corporations that comply with their
codes with preferences for government contracts and financial assistance
in their trade and exports. Governments also should reprove corporations
313
314

Stephens, supra note 155, at 402-03.
Rubin, supra note 14, at 1286.
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that do not comply by the removal of financial assistance, as well as the
threat of liability under national laws. This approach inspired two U.S.
bills: the Good Corporate Citizenship and Federal Procurement Incentives
Act of 1997 and the Corporate Code of Conduct Act of 2001.315
One way to monitor MNEs would be to require mandatory disclosure
not only of MNE financial information but also of “the social, political,
environmental and human rights implications of their actions.”316 Public
reports will put the MNEs under great social pressure to comply with their
codes and to act with great care, and will be welcomed by “consumers and
the investment community [who] will be able to effectively and equitably
determine

MNEs’

ethical

standards

that

deserve

their

financial

patronage.”317 Finally, it will enhance transparency and make easier the
eradication of bribery at corporate levels.
To ensure the enforcement of mandatory disclosure laws, the laws
must provide sanctions for misleading disclosure and for non-disclosure,
which can expose companies to greater liabilities and can act as another
powerful motivation for a change in business practices.318

315

See Westfield, supra note 9, at 1104-05, for a description of both bills. Although they did not
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316
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415 (2001). The requirement of greater disclosure is the type of approach taken by many
organizations, such as the OEDC in its Guidelines for MNE in an attempt to achieve more
transparency.
317
Westfield, supra note 9, at 1108.
318
Williams, supra note 316, at 421.

63

2. Vertical and Horizontal Enforcement: Support by the International
Community

The support of the international community can ensure a higher
degree of compliance by developing states and MNEs. On the ambit of
vertical

enforcement,

one

mechanism

to

exercise

pressure

for

implementing minimum standards could be “conditional lending by
international financial institutions.”319 This process could be effective if it is
supported by institutions such as the World Bank or the International
Monetary Fund, which could incorporate these human rights, labor, and
environmental standards as one condition more in the their “Golden
Straitjacket.” In particular, the IMF, which has substantial powers, even
more than the WTO, could exercise pressure on developing countries to
comply with its conditions.320 Nevertheless, only the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development is considering the inclusion of labor
standards as a prerequisite for financial loans.321
International

organizations

also

can

introduce

a

system

of

information and research to measure the degree of compliance of
governments and MNEs in particular. They could use the results to exert
pressure on violators by taking the measures that are among their
faculties. For instance, the IMF or the WB could deny financial help to
319
320
321

Charnovitz, supra note 30, at 150.
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Charnovitz, supra note 30, at 150.
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violators-governments, the WTO could impose a ban on the trade of
products from violators-governments or violators-MNE, and the ILO, the
UN and other non-governmental organizations could use bad publicity
against MNE that do not comply with minimum standards.
Horizontal

enforcement

could

include

the

requirement

the

governments of developed and developing countries consent to boycott
products made by lower standards. The British Labour Party and Trades
Union Congress already had proposed this approach at the World
Economic Conference of 1927, recommending an international convention
whereby all member would agree to boycott goods made under lower
conditions than those promoted by the ILO Conventions.322
Moreover, the ILO should take a more aggressive role in its mission
to promote labor standards, such as implementing the trade controls
established by new conventions.323 It could demand that governments not
trade in goods made in violation of their labor standards, a technique
which is already used in the environmental area.324

It is important to

realize that “[t] his measure is not an economic sanction against a target
country, but rather a trade control on odious products.”325
Another useful practice is the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP), under “which industrial countries provide duty-free treatment to
322
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324
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certain products from developing countries.”

326

The United States and the

European Union have put this system into practice, emphasizing labor
conditions.327 Once the U.S. GSP was established, it gave preferences to
the beneficiary countries for ten years.328 When in 1984 it extended the
period for eight and a half years, it introduced a new category of countries
which were excluded from GSP benefits “if such country has not taken or
is not taking steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights to
workers in the country.”329
The United States also used this kind of mechanism to influence
foreign nation to adopt minimum labor standards in the Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act,330 which commands the President to consider if
the workers in a country are afforded “reasonable workplace conditions
and enjoy the right to organize and bargain collectively” when giving trade
benefits to Caribbean countries.331 Minimum labor standards were also
considered in the Overseas Private Investment Corporation Act,332 which
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improves “U.S. development assistance programs by insuring and/or
facilitating private initiatives.”333

C. Modernization of Corporate Law

In order to achieve greater accountability of MNEs, it is necessary to
revise the traditional concepts of corporate law worldwide. The relations
among the different enterprises inside a MNE vary from MNE to MNE, and
even in the same MNE, the relations may differ depending on the kind of
decision to be made.334 It seems that the best way to determine whether
a parent should be held liable for its subsidiaries is by establishing in each
case whether the control of the parent was effectively exercised.335 This
approach permits a flexible system; in addition, the burden of proof
should be placed on the parent.336
What seems pretty obvious is that the greater the parent is involved
in the day-to-day control of the subsidiary, the greater its liability should
be.337 A proposed flexible system should take into account many factors
that ultimately will determine the kind and degree of liability of a MNE in

333
334
335
336
337
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Antunes, supra note 1, at 228-29.
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each concrete case.338 Some factors that have been proposed are the
following:

(i) The ties of the MNE with the host government. The more influence a
corporation has in the government, the larger are its duties in the area of
human rights -a duty of private actors and states not to be complicit to
the violation of human rights.339
(ii) The control of the MNE over the population affected. The more control
a corporation has over individuals, the more duties it has towards them.340
The MNE will have higher duties if it has a direct impact upon the physical
and mental health and well-being of the people.341
(iii) The influence of the MNE with respect to who is actually doing the
violation -if is a subsidiary, a supplier, etc.342
All these considerations converge with what Phillip I. Blumberg had in
mind when he stated, “[E]nterprise law is a product of the modern age, an
age in which the law is increasingly concerned with multifactor factual
analysis, rather than with transcendental legal constructs.”343
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D. Host Countries Should Ensure an Impartial Forum to Its Nationals

Host countries should take strong steps to strengthen their judicial
systems to provide their citizens with adequate forums to pursue their
legitimate claims. To achieve that goal, changes have to be made in the
following areas:

(i) In the structure of courts in order to offer impartial courts.
(ii) In the civil and criminal legislation to provide effective causes of action
for violations of minimum standards, ensuring the accountability of
corporations and a just indemnification for victims.
(iii) In the procedural legislation to facilitate litigation by the plaintiff, such
as importing U.S. mechanisms such as contingent fees and class actions.

These changes will require an important structural modification of
most legal systems and governments will have to contribute substantial
financial resources to effect the modification, but such action is necessary
and worthwhile.
One alternative method to ensure that citizens with have an adequate
forum would be to import the dispute resolution clause between MNEs and
host

governments

which

is

included

in

most

bilateral

investment

agreements. In the clause, the MNE would agree to submit to the
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jurisdiction of an international court of justice or arbitration tribunal
whenever nationals of the host country raise a claim to that court for
violations of the minimum standards by the particular MNE. This clause
could be included in each bilateral investment agreements. It would be an
effective way to submit such claims to neutral courts, which have nothing
to do with the MNE or the host country, and it would be specially useful
for developing countries that have a weak judicial system. However, the
cost of litigation can be higher under this approach, and governments
should find a way to lessen the burden on plaintiffs by creating a fund,
requiring

MNEs

to

contribute

liability

insurance

or

other

financial

assistance.

E. A Sensitive Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine

As was stated above, host countries should provide their nationals
with an adequate forum to avoid forcing their nationals to litigate in other
countries.344 Nevertheless, in those exceptional cases where the plaintiff is
litigating abroad, home countries should offer impartial courts to the
foreign plaintiff, who may be left without any other remedy, instead of
automatically protecting their MNEs with controversial mechanisms such
as the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

344

Ward, supra note 12, at 468.
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The model to be followed by common law courts should be the action
taken by some American judges, who have departed from the Piper
Aircraft standard, showing sensitivity to the particular circumstances of
the foreign plaintiff.345 These courts considered whether in the particular
case justice could be done by the alternative forum. For instance, some
courts considered if the lack of class actions in the foreign forum would
impede the litigation, and if the corruption of the foreign government
would impede an adequate resolution of the case to the extent to make
the foreign forum inadequate.346 In addition, many courts dismissed the
case under the forum non conveniens ground subject to certain conditions
such as the submission of the MNE to the jurisdiction of the foreign
court.347

345

Dorward, supra note 171, at 162.
See Carella, supra note 240, at 723-728, for an extended analysis of these considerations by
many courts.
347
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V. CONCLUSION

Society demands greater corporate accountability. MNEs have to
learn that they cannot act with impunity because if they engage in abusive
practices or violate environmental standards, they will have to confront
negative publicity and liability; in the end, it is in their own interest to be
careful.
The solution to the problem of MNE responsibility should be an
internationally coordinated approach, where the main responsibility must
be on host countries to agree to raise their low standards and to enact
legislation that will effectively enforce the new standards. In addition, the
support

and

pressure

exerted

by

international

organizations

and

developed countries will be necessary to ensure that all developing
countries are doing their best to comply with their commitments, and that
MNEs are complying with local laws.
Furthermore, traditional concepts of corporate law need to be
modernized worldwide to avoid the impunity of MNEs that hide under the
corporate veil. This thesis proposed a flexible system that will analyze the
different factors of each case to satisfactorily determine corporate
responsibility.
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Moreover, impartial courts should be available to potential plaintiffs
to ensure that justice will be done, as well as to encourage MNEs to
engage in positive changes in business behavior. Host countries should
strengthen their procedural and substantive laws to effectively deal with
this type of litigation and to provide its nationals with an adequate forum,
either national or international. Home countries additionally should open
the doors of their courts to foreign plaintiffs that are left with no remedy.
If these recommendations are implemented, then the values of our
global society will put the well-being of individuals over economic
interests. In the words of Halina Ward, “Encouraging

global

corporate

responsibility then becomes part of efforts to put a human face on the
global economy.”

348
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